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Eighth District Banks in
1989:
I ~FTER REBOUNDING sharply in 1988, most
commercial banks in the Eighth Federal Reserve
District experienced modest increases in prof-
itability in 1989 and continued to outperform
their national counterparts.1 With few excep-
tions, Eighth District banks were largely un-
scathed by the rough weather which battered
some segments of the industry, especially losses
from real estate loans and loans to lesser-devel-
oped countries (LDC5), which depressed earn-
ings at many of the nation’s largest banks.
The performance of Eighth District commer-
cial banks in 1989 vs. their national peers is
analyzed in this paper.2 Conventional perfor-
mance measures, including bank earnings, asset
quality and capital adequacy, are examined to
assess the financial condition and operating
soundness of the District’s banking industry. In
addition, the compositions of assets and liabili-
ties at District and U.S. banks are compared to
explain why District bank performance ratios
differ from those of their national peers.
EARNINGS
Eighth District banks earned $1.14 billion in
1989, an increase of 1.7 percent from 1988
earnings of $1.12 billion. Earnings for all U.S.
banks of comparable size were $14.54 billion in
1989, up 7 percent from 1988. Earnings for the
entire banking industry fared poorly in 1989,
however, because of the subpar performance of
the 43 banks with total assets greater than
$10 billion; including these 43 banks, 1989 earn-
ings totaled $15.86 billion, down 3&4 percent
from 1988 earnings of $24.56 billion.
The number of District banks reporting losses
for the year fell again in 1989: just 50 banks, or
4 percent of the District total, incurred losses in
1989 compared with 79 banks (6.1 percent) in
1988 and 88 banks (6.7 percent) in 1987. Na-
tionally, 11.3 percent of commercial banks with
assets of less than $10 billion—banks compar-
able in size to Eighth District banks—reported
losses in 1989, down from 14.4 percent in 1988
and 185 percent in 1987; slightly more than 25
1The Eighth Federal Reserve District comprises the follow-
ing: Arkansas, entire state; Illinois, southern 44 counties;
Indiana, southern 24 counties; Kentucky, western 64 coun-
ties; Mississippi, northern 39 counties; Missouri, eastern
and southern 71 counties and the City of St. Louis; Ten-
nessee, western 21 counties.
2Unless otherwise noted, performance ratios for all U.S.
banks exclude those banks with assets of more than
$10 billion, as there are no District banks of that size. See
Karrenbrock (1990) for a detailed analysis of District
agricultural bank performance in 1989. For bank perfor-
mance statistics on each Eighth District state, see Clark
(forthcoming).
In the Eye of a Storm?
MAY/JUNE WEEpercent of banks with assets greater than 810
billion reported net losses in 1989, up dramati-
cally from 5.1 percent in 1988. Substantial in-
creases in loan loss provisions were primarily
responsible for the increase in the proportion of
large banks incurring losses in 1989.1
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When examining bank earnings, two standard
profitability measures generally are employed:
the return on average assets (BOA) ratio and
the return on equity (ROE) ratio. BOA, calcu-
lated by dividing a bank’s net income by its
average annual assets, indicates how successful-
ly bank management employed the hank’s assets
to earn income. ROE, the ratio of a bank’s net
income to its equity capital, provides share-
holders with a measure of the institution’s re-
turn on their investment.~
As table I indicates, Eighth District banks
recorded an average ROA of 0.88 percent and
an average ROE of 11.26 percent in 1989. Both
measures were down from their 1988 levels
because of a sharp drop in profitability among
the District’s largest banks. Average ROA and
ROE for the District’s 13 banks with assets of
$1 to $10 billion fell from 0.82 percent to 0.61
percent and from 12.46 percent to 9.53 percent,
respectively, over the period.
District banks in asset categories of less than
$1 billion, however, generally experienced small
average increases in BOA and ROE from 1988
to 1989. District banks in the $25 million to
$300 million asset range, which comprise about
two-thirds of all District banks, did somewhat
better, experiencing an average 5 percent in-
crease in BOA in 1989 and a 3.4 percent in-
crease in ROE. For the nearly two-thirds of U.S.
banks in this same asset category, the improve-
ments in BOA and ROE from 1988 to 1989 were
even more substantial: 20.2 percent and 17 per-
cent, respectively. The smallest U.S. banks, those
with assets of less than $25 million, experienced
a 100 percent increase in BOA and a 97.9 per-
cent increase in ROE in 1989; ROA and ROE for
District banks in this asset category changed lit-
tle from their 1988 levels.
Even though most U.S. banks showed stronger
earnings improvement than their District coun-
terparts, District banks continued to outperform
their national peers in 1989: the national aver-
ages of 0.74 percent BOA and 10.25 percent
ROE remained below the levels achieved by
District banks. Across asset categories, only
District banks in the $1 billion to $10 billion
range registered average ROA and ROE below
that of their national counterparts. Earnings
wet-c depressed or negative for some District
banks in that asset category because of large
additions to loan loss provisions associated with
commercial real estate loans and loans to LDCs,’
(]ornoc~nents Earnbzas
As with any business entity, a bank’s financial
success is determined by how much revenue its
activities generate over and above the costs in-
curred in generating that revenue, In assessing
the earnings performance of banks, analysts
typically examine the three major components
of income and expense: net interest income, net
noninterest income and the loan loss provision.
These components, like net income, are typically
adjusted by average assets to ease comparison
among banks. An analysis of these individual
items permits a more precise determination as
to why an institution experienced a profit or a
loss in any period.
lYe: let reel Marl/In—The net interest mar-
gin is calculated by dividing the difference be-
tween interest income (what a bank earned on
loans and investments) and interest expense
(what it paid its depositors) by average earning
~itshould be noted that increases in provisions for loan
losses by the nation’s largest banks in 1989 largely reflect
problem loans to LDCs and more recent problems with
real estate lending. These losses will not necessarily affect
future profitability.
4Equity capital consists of common and perpetual preferred
stock, surplus, undivided profits and capital reserves and
cumulative foreign currency translation adjustments.
~U.S.banks with assets greater than $10 billion had an
even rougher year in 1989, with average ROA of just 0.11
percent compared with 0.94 percent in 1988 and ROE of





































































































































































































1989 1988 1987 1986
Eighth United Eighth United Eighth United Eighth United
Asset category District States District States District States District States
Ali banks1 4.13% 4.44% 4.16% 4 42°,b 4.27°/o 4.48% 4.400/0 4.49%
Less than $25 million 427 455 4.28 4.51 445 4.61 468 4.73
$25450 million 4.22 4.55 4.22 449 4.34 4.59 4.56 4.75
550-5100 million 4.14 452 412 4.49 &33 4.59 4.56 477
5100-5300 million 4.20 4.60 4 17 451 4.39 4.59 4.45 468
$300 million-Si billion 4.42 4.57 4.37 44 6 4.55 456 4.46 4.65
S1-$i0 billion 3.89 4.32 4.04 4.35 3.97 436 4 14 4.25
‘All banks includes only those banks with assets of less than $10 billion.
NOTE: Interest income has been adjusted upward by the taxable equivalence of tax-exempt state
and local securities.
SOURCE. FFIEC Reports of Condition and Income for Insured Commercial Banks. 1986-1989
trict average of 4.13 percent. U.S. banks posted
higher net interest margins than District banks
in every comparable asset category for all four
years shown in table 2.~
eternal teenIer an: ElYn:n1sr~—Differences
in net interest margins among banks in differ-
ent asset classes and geographic areas can be
explained by looking at the income and expense
components of the ratio. As figure 1 illustrates,
interest income as a percent of average earning
assets for District banks averaged 10.25 percent
in 1989, up sharply from the 1988 ratio of 9.53
percent. District banks with assets of less than
$100 million posted increases in interest income
margins ranging from 4.5 percent to 6.3 per-
cent; those with assets of more than $100 mil-
lion posted increases of 7.8 percent to 9.1
percent.
As in 1988, interest income as a percent of
average earning assets was positively related to
bank size in 1989. The greater interest income-
earning ability of larger banks can be explained
by their tendency to hold less of their assets in
relatively low-return securities than in relatively
high-return loans compared with the smaller
banks. The relative proportions of securities and
loans in their asset portfolios also account for
much of the margin differences between Dis-
trict banks and their U.S. counterparts. Across
all asset categories, District banks held a larger
proportion of their assets in the form of secu-
rities than did their national peers over the
1987-89 period.
Figure 1 also indicates that interest expense
increased more than interest income in 1989.
While interest income as a percent of average
earning assets increased 76 percent at District
banks in 1989, the interest expense ratio ad-
vanced 14 percent. Most of the increase in in-
terest expense occurred in the first part of
1989, when rates paid on deposits and other
interest-bearing liabilities were higher because
of relatively restrictive monetary policy and
competition from troubled thrifts that were of-
fering high rates to meet their funding require-
ments. Because the average maturity of bank
‘The story is different for the large U.S. banks. The
average net interest margin for banks with assets greater
than $10 billion fell 9.5 percent in 1989 to 3.43 percent.
This 36 basis-point decline pulled down the net interest
margin for the U.S. banking industry in 1989 to 4M7 from
4.19 in 1988.Figure 1
~nterest ~ncome and ~nterest Expense as a
Percent of Average Earifing Assets
assets tends to be longer than that of their de-
posits, rising interest rates impose increasing in-
terest expense at a time when interest income
tends to be constant or increasing more slowly,
thus exerting downward pressure on net in-
terest margins.
Every asset category of District banks except
for one had higher interest expense ratios than
their U.s. counterparts in 1989. Moreover, of
the four years shown in figure 1, 1989 was the
only year in which the overall District average
was lower than the national one. The interest
expense differentials among District banks and
their national peers can be explained by looking
at the composition of their interest-bearing lia-
bilities. As illustrated in column I of table 3,
deposit interest expense made up a greater
share of total interest expense for most catego-
ries of District banks than for comparable US.
banks in 1989. These greater shares can be at-
tributed to the higher proportion of interest-
Percent Percent
1986 1987 1988 1989
SOURCE: FFIEC Reports of Condition and Income for Commercial Banks, 1986-1989Table 3
Composition of Interest Expense and Related Liabilities, 1989
DIE/TIE IBD/IL Avg DR FFEITIE - FFI’/TL
Eighth United Eighth United Eighth United Eighth United Eighth United
Asset category District States District States District States District States District States
All banks1 8831% 8438% 7544% 7129% 698% 6.95% 962% 1131% 7.04% 7.73%
Less than $25 million 98.99 99.10 8472 83.88 6.69 665 0.70 0.57 0.46 0.34
525-550 million 9891 9879 86.07 8391 6.80 6.76 0.81 0.80 0.56 0.50
550-5100 million 9826 9779 85.95 82.99 689 680 1.23 1.51 0.91 1.00
5100-5300 million 9548 95.28 82.87 8025 6.86 6.78 356 329 263 2.19
$300 million-si billion 8885 87.41 74.12 7385 6.84 6.89 990 9.14 7.42 6.05
51-510 billion 7393 7576 61.19 6364 7.36 7.13 2141 1761 15.80 1231
DIE deposit interest expense
TIE = total interest expense
IBD = interest-bearing deposits
TL = total liabilities
Avg DR = average deposit rate (DIE/IBD)
FFE federal funds purchased and securities sold under agreements to repurchase expense
FFP = federal funds purchased and securities sold under agreements to repurchase
‘All banks include only those banks with assets of less than $10 billion.
SOURCE- FFIEC Reports of Condition and Income for Insured Commercial Banks. 1986-1989
bearing deposits to total liabilities held by Dis- funding. The higher concentrations of interest-
trict banks (column 3) and the higher average bearing deposits and federal funds in their
rate paid on those deposits (column 5). liabilities portfolios and the higher average rates
-- . . . . paid by District banks on deposits together ac-
In addition, most District banks paid a higher - . -
- counted for much of the differentials in interest
share of total interest expense for federal funds -
-- expense ratios between District and U.S. banks
than their national peers (column 7)8 The ma-
-- -, - - from 1986 to 1989. jority of District banks held a higher proportion
of federal funds purchased and securities sold
under agreements to repurchase to total liabili- Xe! ;Vnnintrrrat lhrXin—The net nonin-
ties than US. banks overall (column 9). The terest margin is an indicator of a bank’s opera-
federal funds rate for 1989 averaged 9,21 per- ting efficiency and its ability to generate fee in-
cent, approximately 2.2 percentage points higher come. The net noninterest margin is calculated
than the average deposit rate, making federal by subtracting noninterest expense (overhead)
funds a significantly more expensive source of from noninterest income and dividing by aver-
8Federal funds expense as a percent of total interest ex-
pense and federal funds purchased as a percent of total
liabilities appear lower for District banks overall than for
U.S. banks. This total figure is skewed, however, by the
larger proportion of federal funds held by U.S. banks in
the $1 billion to $10 billion asset category and by the
larger proportion of U.S. banks in this asset class relative
to District banks. These different distributions furtheril-
lustrate why it is necessary to break down banks by asset
category to assess bank performance more accurately.
rFnFaa~~ perIl nIl cn-age assets.9 Because noninterest expense usually
exceeds noninterest income, the calculation
yields a negative number; it is common practice,
however, to report the noninterest margin as a
positive number. Smaller net noninterest mar-
gins, therefore, indicate better bank perfor-
mance, all else equal.
Because the net noninterest margin usually is
negative and thus depresses earnings, and the
income and expense components of this margin
tend to be items that banks have more control
over than interest income and expense, bank
managers increasingly are seeking ways to re-
duce the net noninterest margin. Excessive
overhead frequently is mentioned by banking
executives as a barrier to maintaining accep-
table profitabifity levels. Consolidation of opera-
tions and increased automation are just two
ways the industry is seeking to control the
largest portion of overhead, employee salaries
and benefits.
In 1989, as in previous years, all asset catego-
ries of Eighth District banks recorded lower net
noninterest margins than their national peers.
District banks recorded a net noninterest mar-
gin of t93 percent in 1989 vs. 2.12 percent for
U,5. banks of comparable size. Despite lower
ratios of noninterest income for most categories
of banks, District banks continue to record
lower net noninterest margins than their u.S.
peers because of their consistently lower
overhead ratios.
Income Lemcmn: As il-
lustrated in table 4, District banks generated a
noninterest income to average assets ratio of 1
percent in 1989 compared with t22 percent for
U-s. banks overall. The pattern of noninterest
earnings across asset categories over the last
three years continued in 1989, as U.S. banks
with assets of less than $300 million once again
generated more noninterest income relative to
average assets than their District peers, while
District banks with assets greater than $300
million outperformed their national peers. The
lower ratios for smaller District banks relative
to larger District banks can be partially attri-
buted to a lesser demand for trust activities and
foreign currency transactions in most pans of
the District as well as the large number of rural
banks that charge no or low fees for many bank
services. Lower ratios of off-balance-sheet items
to total assets also explain lower noninterest in-
come margins at District banks’°
Overall, noninterest expense fell from 1988 to
1989 at both the District and the U.S. level, as
many banks were successful in their cost-cut-
ting efforts. Across all asset categories, District
banks maintained lower overhead ratios than
their national counterparts for all four years
shown in table 4, For District banks, the over-
head ratio of 2.93 percent was approximately 13
percent lower than for U.S. banks of compar-
able size in 1989, These consistently lower over-
head ratios can be explained by a number of
factors; lower average salaries and benefits in
the District; a lack of extensive branching, which
keeps overall operating expenses down; and the
large proportion of District banks located in
nonmetropolitan areas where building, land,
rental and maintenance costs are relatively low.
Pyen;Pine --In sharp
contrast to 1988, when loan and lease loss pro-
visions dropped substantially from their 1987
levels, total loss provisions rose substantially in
1989 for District banks and their U.S. peers.
The District loan loss provision totaled $595
million in 1989, up 303 percent from the 1988
provision of $456 million. For U.S. banks of
comparable size, the provision rose 2t7 percent
to $13.53 billion. As table 5 reveals, much of
the reversal was concentrated at the largest
District and U-S. banks. The loan loss provision
to average assets ratio increased 16,7 percent
for District banks with assets of $300 million to
$1 billion, but 56.5 percent for the 13 banks
9Noninterest expense is the sum of the costs incurred in
the bank’s day-to-day operations, which includes employee
salaries and benefits, expenses of premises and fixed
assets, as well as legal and directors’ fees, insurance
premiums and advertising and litigation costs. Noninterest
income includes income from fiduciary (trust) activities,
service charges on deposit accounts, trading gains (losses)
from foreign exchange transactions, gains (losses) and
fees from assets held in trading accounts, and charges
and fees from miscellaneous activities like safe deposit
rentals, bankdraft and money order sales, and mortgage
servicing.
‘°Off-balance-sheetitems represent obligations by a bank to
acquire certain assets or liabilities at a future date provid-
ed contractual conditions are met- They include such
diverse financial instruments as loan commitments, letters
of credit, interest rate swaps and loan sales- Banks usually
earn fee income from providing such services, but do not
have to hold capital or funding liabilities against the assets
until they are actually booked. Off-balance-sheet activities
still subject a bank to risks, which is why these items will
be included in the new risk-based capital requirements
banks will have to meet by the end of 1990.Table 4






Eighth United Eighth United Eighth United




All banks1 1.00% 122% 0.98% 1.20% 0.99% 1.16% 1.01% 1.13%
Less than $25 million 057 1.25 0.58 0.90 0.57 0,95 0,55 0.85
0.58 0-fl 055 015 0.53 070 0.52 0.70
0.55 051 055 0-79 052 014 052 0.74
0.80 0-92 0.74 058 0.fl 0.88 f173 0,89
117 113 123 112 129 110 125 111
150 147 151 149 152 144 169 139
Noninterest Expense (Overhead)
1989 1988 1987 1986
Eighth United Eighth United Eighth United Eighth United
District States District States Distnct States District States
Allbanks’ 293% 334% 297% 337% 298% 338% 298% 334%
Lessthan$2smillion 308 393 307 378 308 383 309 3fl
$25450 million 275 333 272 330 269 328 265 328
$50-$lOOmilIion 252 318 257 319 257 319 259 321
$1004300 million 2.77 3.27 2.77 3.25 250 3,23 2.74 3.24
$300 million$1 billion 320 3.31 3.32 3-40 3.37 3.38 a46 3.46
$1410 billion 3.18 3.38 3.27 3.42 3.27 3.42 3.30 3.35
with assets of $1 billion to $10 biffion; U.S.
banks in those categories made more modest
additions to their provisions, 1.7 percent and
37.5 percent, respectivelyhl
The substantial increases in the provision
ratios for the large District banks were primar-
ily the result of large provisions taken by Ten-
nessee banks to cover the nonperforming real
estate loans of a local developer as well as a
large provision at another big District bank to
cover remaining exposure to LDC debt. Deterio-
rating commercial real estate and foreign loan
portfolios led to provision increases nationwide
as well. Some analysts have suggested that banks
that made large increases in provisions in 1987
to cover nonperforming foreign loans were not
as vigilant in assessing their growing real estate
loan portfolios in 1988 and 1989. Rather than
recognizing potential losses in 1988, which
would have depressed profits for a second
“The loss provision ratio for the 43 LLS. banks with assets
greater than $10 billion almosttripled in 1989, rising from







‘All banks includes only those banks with assets ofless than $10 billion.
SOURCE: EFIEC Reports of Condition and Income for Insured Commercial Banks, 1986-1989.~tsswr(IU.ALITY
Asset quality was a major determinant in the
pattern of earnings for banks nationwide in the
1980s, and 1989 was no exception. The major
area of concern, however, has shifted from the
quality of foreign loans to the performance of
real estate loans. The substantial losses already
incurred from foreign lending and the mounting
losses from real estate lending have not escaped
the notice of shareholders or regulators. Bank
stock prices in many parts of the country have
ten off the bank’s books for a given period.
.Nnnperforinidg .Lnnns and .Lases
Nonperforming loans comprise loans and lease
financing receivables that are 90 days or more
past due or in nonaccrual status.14 The level of
nonperforming loans and leases at District
banks totaled $1.21 billion at year-end 1989, a
5.5 percent increase from the level at year-end
1988. Nationally, banks of comparable size ex-
perienced a 9.1 percent increase in the level of
nonperforming loans.
‘2See Rose (1990).
laThe new risk-based capital requirements are discussed
briefly in a later section.
‘4Restructured loans and leases that fall into the 90 days or
more delinquent status or in nonaccrual status are includ-
ed as well.
Table 5
Loan and Lease Loss Provision as a Percent of Average Assets
1989 1988 1987 -- 1986
Eighth United Eighth United Eighth United Eighth United
Asset category District States District States District States District States
All banks1 0.46% 069% 0.38% 0.59% 0.60°/n 0.79% 0.59% 077%
Less than $25 million 028 0.49 0.30 0.62 0.49 083 0.68 115
525-550 million 0.27 0.45 03 4 0.55 0.44 07 3 0.67 0.97
550-5100 m~llion 0.28 0.42 0.30 0.49 0.41 0.61 062 0.85
8100-5300 million 0.37 0.43 0.36 0.49 045 0.56 0.64 075
5300 million-si billion 042 0.60 0.36 0.59 04 2 0.72 0.68 0.85
51-510 billion 072 0.88 046 0.64 0.97 0.93 046 0.67
lAll banks includes only those banks with assets of less than $10 billion.
SOURCE: FFIEC Reports of Condition and Income for Insured Commercial Banks, 1986-1989
straight year, many banks delayed making these
large additions until 1989.12
It is important to note, however, that District
provision ratios were still well below those of
their national counterparts in 1989. In addition,
provision ratios declined again in 1989 for Dis~
trict and U.S. banks with assets of less than
$100 million. District banks in these asset cate-
gories, which make up more than 80 percent of
total District banks, experienced an average
decline in the provision ratio of 11.4 percent;
U.S. banks in these categories, which represent
just over 75 percent of ti_S. banks, experienced
an 18.2 percent decline.
fallen, reflecting in part banks’ volatile earnings
pattern of the past few years and the risk-
aversion of many investors. Regulators, too, are
concerned and have refined the tools used to
assess loan portfolios. They have also adjusted
minimum capital ratios to reflect the riskiness
of a bank’s asset portfolio13
Asset quality may be gauged by examining the
nonperforming loan ratio and the ratio of net
loan losses to total loans. The nonperforming
loan ratio indicates the current level of problem
loans as well as the potential for future loan
losses. The ratio of net loan losses to total loans
specifies the percentage of loans actually writ-
MAY/JUNE n-9oTaole 6.
Nonpeffcrmng Loans and L-3ases as a Per~ert& Tota~ Loagi.s
19C9 ~88 198? 1988
Eighth Linitee Eigit~ United Eighth d~!ted Eighth Un’ta~
Asset ~atcgQry 0-~srict States D!st:iot States ~istr!ct States District Sth~es
AU bar,i~s 1.60% 2.2006, 1c20/h 2 10% 2 10% 2 40% 2.16% 2.40%
Less than $25 mihon 171 2.31 1.80 265 2.12 3.16 2.66 376
525-550 m~IUon l.fl 215 1 72 2.43 2.14 275 2.61 3.19
550-6100 million 1.47 198 1.65 2.19 2.04 2.45 2.46 2.93
5100-5300 million 1 87 1 92 1.70 1 69 1.95 2.20 2.04 2.53
9300 million-Si billion 1.42 2.36 1 25 271 1 47 2.28 2.33 2.51
51-510 billion 1.65 227 1.65 1.92 2.44 2.41 1.81 2.06
‘All banks inckjdes o-i~y those banks with assets of oss Ihan $10 billion
SOURCE: PFIEC Reports of Condition and Income for Insured Commercial Banks. 1986-1989
Despite the rise in the absolute level of non-
performing loans at District banks, the ratio of
nonperforming loans and leases to total loans
declined from 1,62 percent in 1988 to 160 per-
cent in 1989. As table 6 indicates, the 1989
nonperforming loan ratio for District banks was
the lowest of the four years shown. In 1989,
only District banks with assets of $300 million
to $1 billion experienced an increase in the non-
performing loan ratio; nonetheless, this category
of banks recorded the lowest nonperforming
loan ratio (1.42 percent) among District asset
categories in 1989.
In contrast to District banks, U.S. banks ex-
perienced an increase in the absolute level of
nonperforming loans and the nonperforming
loan ratio in 1989. For US. banks with assets of
less than $10 billion, the nonperforming loan
ratio increased from 2.10 percent in 1988 to 2.20
percent in 1989. Although the nonperforming
loan ratio fell substantially across most asset cate-
gories, an 18.2 percent increase in the ratio for
banks with assets of $1 billion to $10 billion was
large enough to boost the ratio for all bajiks.15
15The nonperforrning loan ratio for the nation’s largest banks
registered its second straight year of improvement in 1989,
declining to 4.41 percent from 4.47 percent in 1988 and
5.26 percent in 1987.
The distribution of nonperforming loans by
loan type for District banks over the past four
years is illustrated in figure 2. For the second
straight year, real estate loans made up the
largest share of nonperforming loans, almost 50
percent at year-end 1989, up from 43 percent
in 1988. The rise in the share of nonperforming
real estate loans was almost completely offset
by a fall in the proportion of nonperforming
commercial and industrial loans, from 41 per-
cent of nonperforming loans in 1988 to 35 per-
cent in 1989. The share of nonperforming agri-
cultural loans to total nonperforming loans fell
again in 1989 to approximately 4 percent, less
than half the percentage recorded at year-end
1986. The ratio of nonperforming consumer
loans to total nonperforming loans held steady
at District banks in 1989.
.PVS. LatIn 81111 ..LaMse La/INnS
A more direct measure of loan problems than
the nonperforming loan ratio is the percentage
of loans and leases actually written off a bank’s
books. Net loan and lease losses are calculated2
D~str~ct Distribution of Nonperform~ngLoans
by Loan Type
1987 1988 1989
NOTE: Percentages may sum to greater than 100 because agricultural ~oansare
induded hi other categories as wall.







by totaling loan and lease charge-offs and sub-
tracting recoveries over a given period. Net loan
and lease losses totaled $505 million at District
banks in 1989, down almost 2 percent from
1988 net charge-offs. Net charge-offs at U.S.
banks of comparable size rose 0.8 percent in
1989 to $10.4 billion.
The ratio of net loan and lease losses to total
loans is an indicator of problem lending in the
current year as well as prior years, because of
bank management’s partial discretion in deter-
mining when a loan is deemed uncollectible and
is thus written off.’~As table 7 indicates, the
net loan loss ratios for District and comparable
‘6Bank management will adjust the loan loss provision in the
current year to reflect nonperforming loans; those loans
may be carried on a bank’s books for years before a deci-
sion is made to write them off. Bank supervisors also help
decide when to write off loans, and in fact can force a
bank to write off a loan that is still performing by the
bank’s standards. Net loan and lease losses do not affect
current earnings as the loan loss provision does; rather,
they lust alter the allowance for loan losses (or loan loss







Net Loan and Lease Losses as a Percent of Total Loans
1989 1988 1987 1986
Eighth United Eighth United Eighth United Eighth United
Asset category District States District States District States District States
All banks1 067% 083°/o 0.73% 0.87% 0.70% 0.89% 0.88°/o 0.97%
Less than $25 milUon 0.45 084 0.60 1.14 0.95 1.50 1.33 203
$25-$50 million 0.42 0.74 053 0.88 0.74 1.18 1.16 1.61
$50-$100 million 044 0.64 0.47 0.74 0.70 0.96 1 07 1 35
$100-$300 million 053 060 050 0.66 067 0.78 0.99 1.02
$300 million-Si billion 051 0 78 0.42 0.78 0 71 087 0.92 0.99
$1-Sb billion 1.00 0.96 1.18 0.95 0.68 0.86 0.57 0.73
‘All banks includes only those banks with assets of less than $10 billion.
SOURCE: EFIEC Reports of Condition and Income for Insured Commercial Banks. 1986-1989
US. banks declined from 1988 to 1989” District
banks wrote off 67 cents for every $100 in loans
on the books at year-end 1989, compared with
83 cents for U.S. banks of comparable size. Ex-
cept for banks in the $1 billion to $10 billion
asset category, District net loan loss ratios re-
mained well below those of their national coun-
terparts in 1989, as they had for the previous
three years.
The net loan loss ratio for District banks
declined in 1989 across all but two asset cate-
gories; paralleling the rise in the nonperforming
loan ratio, the net loan loss ratio rose 21 per-
cent for banks with assets of $300 million to
$1 billion. District banks with assets of $1 bil-
lion to $10 billion experienced a 15.3 percent
decline in their net loan loss ratio, as banks that
had taken large provisions for LDC loan losses
in 1987 wrote off comparatively more of those
loans in 1988 than in 1989. For District banks
with assets of less than $50 million, the net loan
loss ratio declined dramatically again in 1989,
reflecting the continuing rebound from agri-
cultural loan losses in the mid-1980s.
The distribution of loan losses by loan type
for District and U.S. banks is illustrated in table
8. The data are further separated into two asset
categories to illustrate the lending patterns of
small vs. large banks, as agricultural loan losses
have been primarily concentrated at small banks
while foreign loan losses have been incurred by
large banks. For banks with assets of less than
$300 million, losses on commercial and industrial
loans once again made up more than 50 percent
of total loan losses at both the District and na-
tional levels. The share of commercial loan
losses at small District and U.S. banks has fallen
steadily since 1986, while losses from consumer
lending have increased substantially since 1986
at District and U.S. banks of comparable size.
After making up nearly a quarter of District
and 20 percent of U.S. loan losses in 1986, the
share of agricultural loan losses has dropped
dramatically over the past four years, reflecting
the rebound in the farm economy and the in-
crease in losses from other types of lending,
such as real estate. In contrast to the results at
U.S. banks, the share of real estate loan losses
“Including the nation’s largest banks, however, the U.S. net
loan loss ratio rose almost 13 percent in 1989, reflecting
LDC loans written off by money center banks and commer-
cial real estate loans written off by some of the country’s
largest regional banks.at small District banks actually fell from 1988 to
1989, although the real estate loss share was
roughly the same at both sets of banks. Once
again, there were no losses from foreign len-
ding at small District banks in 1989 and mInimal
losses at the national level.
The largest District banks, with assets of
$300 million to $10 billion, experienced a large
increase in the share of commercial and indus-
trial loan losses in 1989, climbing above the 30
percent level for the first time since 1986- Such
loan losses at U.S. banks made up less than a
third of total loan losses in 1989, as the ratio
continued its steady decline from its 1986 level.
Consumer loan lossesaccounted for the largest
share of total loan losses at U.S. banks in 1989,
and the second largest share at District banks.
The share of real estate loan losses rose approx-
imately 50 percent at both the District and na-
tional level in 1989, and may well surpass con-
sumer and commercial loan loss shares in 1990.
The share of agricultural loan losses more than
doubled at large District banks in 1989, but still
made up the smallest proportion of loan losses
at 038 percent. After comprising almost a third
of loan losses in 1988, foreign loan losses declin-
ed to less than 2 percent of total loan losses at
large District banks in 1989. Most District banks
with outstanding foreign loans wrote off in 1988
the loans for which they took provisions in
1987. The 1989 share of foreign loan losses at
U.S. banks of comparable size also fell from
1988, but was twice the District’s share.
The volatile earnings pattern of banks in re-
cent years, the problem loan portfolios in vari-
ous parts of the country and the growth of off-
balance-sheet items have prompted bank regu-
lators to redefine measurements of the ade-
quacy of financial capital. Banks maintain capital
to absorb losses, provide for asset expansion,
protect uninsured depositors and promote public
confidence in the financial soundness of the
banking industry. Since 1985, banks have been
Table 8
Distribution of Loan Losses
Banks with assets of less than $300 mill~on
Loan type 1989 1988 1987 1986
District
Agriculture 3.70% 6.17% 14.17°/s 23.60%
commercial 53.72 56.16 61.20 66.14
consumer 26.31 20.15 16.23 12.73
Real estate 1984 23.50 22 17 20.95
Foreign1 N.A NA. NA. 0.12
United States
Agriculture 3.20% 4.71% 10.51% 19.13°/o
Commercial 54 76 58.60 6252 69.26
Consumer 24.21 21.21 18.45 15.43
Real estate 20.41 1972 18.52 14.84
Foreign’ 0.10 0.04 0.02 0.01
Banks with assets of $300 million to $10 billion
Loan type 1989 1988 1987 1986
District
Agriculture 0.38°/a 0.15°/a 1.48% 280%
Commercia’ 51 .36 38.34 40.68 55.23
Consumer 2117 16.39 31.10 28.88
Real estate 1924 12.65 1561 10.18
Foreign 178 27 20 3.82 0.23
United States
Agriculture 0 30% 0.29°/n 1.22°/a 344%
Commercial 31.32 36 67 38 71 46.91
Consumer 38.15 32.96 35.51 36 09
Real estate 2402 16.38 14.51 10.63
Foreign’ 4.13 928 6.40 0.47
‘Loans neld in ‘oreign offices, Edge and Agreement subsidi-
aries and international Banking Facilities QBFs~.
NA—not applicable
NOTE: Percentages may sum to more than 100 because some
agricultural loans are -ncluded in more than one
category.
SOLiR~E: FFIEC R~orts ofGondit~on and Income for insured
~ommercai Banks. 1986-1989
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‘Primary capital is the sum of common stock, perpetual
preferred stock, surplus, undivided profits (retained earn-
ings), contingency and other capital reserve, qualifying
mandatory convertible instruments, loan and lease loss
reserves, minority interests in consolidated subsidiaries,
less intangible assets excluding purchased mortgage ser-
vicing rights. (For the purposes of this paper, onlythe
goodwill portion of intangible assets was deducted.)
Secondary capital is limited to 50 percent of primary
capital and includes subordinated notes and debentures,
limited-life preferred stock and that portion of mandatory
convertible securities not included in primary capital. Each
bank’s qualifying secondary capital is added to its primary
capital to obtain the total capital level for regulatory pur-
poses. The primary and total capital ratios are obtained by
dividing through by average adjusted assets (average
assets plus the allowance for loan losses less goodwill).Table 9
Primary Capital Ratio
1989 1988 1987 1986
Eighth United Eighth United Eighth United Eighth United
Asset category District States District States District States District States
All banks’ 871% 8.25% 8.72% 8.12% 8.72% 811% 8.47% l.97°/n
Less than $25 million 10.38 11 00 1043 1080 10.11 1058 997 10.36
525-550 million 984 9.92 9.68 9 65 9.52 9.48 92 7 93 0
550-5100 million 9.67 949 948 926 9.35 9.06 9.08 8.82
5100-5300 million 8.85 876 8-85 8.63 8.71 851 8.50 8.26
$300 million-Si billion 87 2 8.23 8.55 7.86 8.50 7.85 8.30 781
51-510 billion 753 753 766 745 789 748 7.52 731
1AII banks includes only those banks with assets of less than $10 billion
SOURCE: FFIEC Reports of Condition and Income for Insured Commercial Banks, 1986-1989
standards wifi be replaced by a new core capital
to total assets ratio (leverage ratio) and capital
ratios based on risk-adjusted assets, standards
designed to adjust capital requirements to the
credit risk of assets and off-balance-sheet
items.’~
Both District banks and their national counter-
parts continued to register average primary
capital ratios well above the minimum standard
in 1989. As table 9 indicates, District banks
averaged a primary capital ratio of 8.71 percent
in 1989, just slightly lower than that achieved in
1987 and 1988. All District bank categories ex-
cept for the smallest (assets of less than $23
million) and the largest ($1 bfflion to $10 billion)
experienced increases or no change in their
primary capital ratios from 1988 to 1989. The
District’s smaliest banks, llke their national
peers, once again recorded an average primary
capital ratio well above the total bank average
in 1989. Unlike the previous three years, when
they had an average ratio substantially higher
than that of their national counterparts, the
largest District banks in 1989 averaged the same
rate as their national peers, 733 percent.
As of December 1989, 11 banks, or 0.9 per-
cent of all District banks, registered primary
capital ratios below the regulatory minimum, an
increase from 1988 when 0.5 percent failed to
meet the requirement. Nationally, 358 or 2.9
percent of US. banks of comparable size re-
corded deficient primary capital ratios at year-
end 1989, compared with 498 banks or 3.9 per-
cent of such banks at year-end 1988.
C:QNCLUSIOItJ
Despite some trouble spots, Eighth District
banks once again outperformed their national
peers in measures of profitability, asset quality
and capital adequacy in 1989. Most District
191he risk-based capital guidelines establish a systematic
framework in which differences in risk profiles among
banking institutions can be assessed in defining regulatory
capital. Assets as well as off-balance-sheet items will be
assigned weights of 0, 20, 50 or 100 percent based on
their riskiness as determined by regulators. Through 1990,
banks have the option of meeting the 5.5 percent primary
capital and 6 percent total capital ratios, or the transition
capital requirements effective at year-end 1990 of 7.25
percent Tier 1 capital to risk-adjusted assets and 3 percent
Tier 1 cap’nal to total assets (leverage ratio). By year-end
1992, all banks will be required to meet the 3 percent
leverage ratio, an 8 percent capital to risk-adjusted assets
ratio and a 4 percent Tier 1 capital to risk-adjusted assets
ratio.
percent qualifying capital to risk-adjusted assets, 3-625banks registered higher profitability ratios than exposure may have considerably more trouble
their U.S. peers, even though the major deter- meeting the new requirements, as those items
minant of ROA, the net interest margin, remain- are being added to the asset base of banks and
ed lower in the District in 1989. Lower loan are being assigned higher risk rates than some
loss provision ratios and net noninterest mar- traditional assets like home mortgages and U.S.
gins at District banks more than compensated government securities.
for lower net interest margins, resulting in -
- As the 1990s begin, bankers across the coun-
higher ROA and ROE. . -- -
try will be faced with economtc uncertainty, a
In contrast to comparable U.S. banks, asset changing regulatory environment and growing
quality continued to improve at District banks problem loans, a climate not unlike that of the
in 1989, as both the nonperforming loan ratio early 1980s. Eighth District banks, with solid
and the net charge-off rate declined. Both Dis- profitability ratios, good asset quality and strong
trict and U.S. banks, however, are experiencing capital positions, are poised to weather the
increases in problem real estate loans and a changes of this decade as they did the changes
substantial decline in asset quality could materi- of the last.
alize in 1990. In addition to imposing new risk-
sensitive capital requirements on banks, regula-
tors will be keeping a close eye on real estate
portfolios. Clark, Michelle A. “Bank Performance in 1989: The Pluses
and Minuses:’ Pieces of Eight, Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Most District and U.S. banks had capital ratios Louis (June 1990).
substantially in excess of current minimum stan- Karrenbrock, Jeffrey D. “The U-S. and District Agricultural
dards in 1989, and the majority of small banks Economy: Continued Strength in 198W’ this Renew
-- (MaylJune 1990).
should have no trouble meeting the new risk- -- -
-- Rose, Sanford. “Mounting Loan-Loss Provisions Weaken based capital requirements and leverage ratio. Regional Bank Profits;’ The American Banker. (February 6,
Larger banks with substantial off-balance-sheet 1990).